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THE HORIZONS OF ANTITRUST 
THE 2016 LEWIS BERNSTEIN MEMORIAL LECTURE 
RICHARD M. STEUER† 
Two economic issues that appeared front and center during 
the 2016 United States presidential election campaign were jobs 
and inequality.  Among the solutions being offered was 
heightened antitrust enforcement.  Some argued simply for more 
enforcement, while others argued that the standard for applying 
the antitrust laws itself needed to be changed. 
The goals of antitrust law have been debated for as long as 
these laws have been on the books, but now, with competition 
laws in effect in over a hundred countries, that debate has gone 
global and has assumed renewed urgency.1 
Not only are there wildly different opinions within the 
United States, but the goals pursued by other nations vary 
widely, creating significant asymmetries that can advantage one 
trading partner over another. 
Until about forty years ago, there was considerable support 
in the United States for an expansive view of antitrust goals, one 
that included such objectives as the dispersion of economic and 
political power.  Since that time, most of these goals have been 
eliminated from antitrust analysis in the United States, leaving 
only the goal of fostering low prices, high quality, and high 
output at low cost.  This goal is commonly termed “consumer 
welfare” or “total welfare,” since advocates of this standard 
usually have defined it to encompass the combined economic 
welfare of consumers and producers, regardless of how that  
† Member of the New York Bar. 
1 “Competition law,” rather than “antitrust law,” is the term used almost 
everywhere outside the United States. 
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welfare is distributed between them.2  By either name, the goal is 
greater efficiency, resulting in lower costs and prices for more 
and better products or services.3 
But there are other goals that are priorities in the world’s 
economies, including not only full employment and altered 
income distribution, and not only the dispersion of economic and 
political power, but also national security, the preservation of 
domestic control over critical resources, the survival of small 
businesses, integration of disparate economic systems, 
preservation of minority cultures, preservation of a diversity of 
viewpoints, preservation of the environment, and others. 
American antitrust jurisprudence once appeared inclined to 
embrace a host of these objectives.  In one of its first antitrust 
opinions, the United States Supreme Court expressed particular 
concern about anticompetitive practices “driving out of business 
the small dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent” 
in commerce.4 
In 1977, United States Federal Trade Commission Chairman 
Michael Pertschuk went further and said that “no responsive 
competition policy can neglect the social and environmental  
2 See Fei Deng & Gregory K. Leonard, Allocative and Productive Efficiency, in 1 
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 449, 
450 (Wayne Dale Collins et al. eds., 2008); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 51 (1993). The United States Supreme 
Court has cited consumer welfare as the goal of antitrust more than once, but it has 
been noted that in none of these opinions has the Court indicated definitively what it 
understood consumer welfare to mean. See Gregory J. Werden, Monopsony and the 
Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707, 721 (2007). 
Judge Bork’s own conception of consumer welfare has been explained as 
encompassing both consumer welfare and producer welfare. Steven C. Salop & R. 
Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and 
Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 646 n.83 (1999); see also Renata Hesse, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the 2016 
Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium: And Never the Twain Shall Meet? 
Connecting Popular and Professional Visions for Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 20, 
2016) (“[A]lthough we believe competition maximizes consumer welfare, the ultimate 
standard by which we judge practices is their effect on competition, not on consumer 
welfare” because sometimes there can be “a loss of important competition even if it is 
difficult to measure its exact consumer impact.”). 
3 See BORK, supra note 2, at 91 (Allocative efficiency and productive efficiency 
“make up the overall efficiency that determines the level of our society’s wealth, or 
consumer welfare.”). 
4 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897). 
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harms . . . : resource depletion, energy waste, environmental 
contamination, worker alienation, [and] the psychological and 
social consequences of marketing-stimulated demands.”5 
In 1979, Professor—and later FTC Chairman—Robert 
Pitofsky published an influential article, The Political Content of 
Antitrust,6 in which he wrote: “It is bad history, bad policy, and 
bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the 
antitrust laws.”  By “political values,” he meant: 
[F]irst, a fear that excessive concentration of economic power
will breed antidemocratic political pressures, and second, a
desire to enhance individual and business freedom by reducing
the range within which private discretion by a few in the
economic sphere controls the welfare of all.  A third . . . concern
is that if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to
develop under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic
concerns, the likely result will be an economy so dominated by a
few corporate giants that it will be impossible for the state not
to play a more intrusive role in economic affairs.
In reaction to these views, other law and economics 
scholars—many from the ascendant “Chicago School”—cautioned 
that inclusion of any goals other than consumer welfare would 
lead to chaos.7  That view came to prevail in the United States, to 
the point that even under the Obama Administration, leaders of 
the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies expressed strongly the 
opinion that the goals of antitrust law should be confined to 
consumer welfare.  In 2014, Federal Trade Commission 
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez warned an international audience 
that although other goals may be worthy in themselves, 
integrating them into competition analysis “can lead to poor 
outcomes.”8  She pointed out that “competition agencies are 
5 Joshua D. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Unfair Methods of Competition After 
the 2015 Commission Statement, 2015 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 3 n.11 (quoting 
Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, New Directions for the FTC, 
Remarks Before the Eleventh New England Antitrust Conference (Nov. 18, 1977), 
reprinted in 308 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) (Supp. 1977)). 
6 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 
1051 (1979). 
7 Lawrence A. Sullivan, Book Review, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1214, 1214–15 (1975) 
(reviewing MILTON HANDLER, HARLAN M. BLAKE, ROBERT PITOFSKY & HARVEY J. 
GOLDSCHMID, TRADE REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS (1974)). 
8 Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 
Antitrust in Asia Conference: Core Competition Agency Principles: Lessons Learned 
at the FTC (May 22, 2014). 
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designed to be experts in competition law and are generally ill 
equipped to undertake an analysis of non-competition public 
interest factors,” and that if governments choose to advance other 
objectives, “that is best done by agencies with the relevant 
expertise.”9  The head of the United States’ Justice Department’s 
Antitrust Division, Bill Baer, similarly remarked that 
enforcement decisions should be “based solely on the competitive 
effects and consumer benefits of the transaction or conduct being 
reviewed.”10  This view was pointedly reflected in language that 
the United States proposed for inclusion in the now-shelved 
Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement: “Each Party shall adopt or 
maintain national competition laws that proscribe 
anticompetitive business conduct, with the objective of promoting 
economic efficiency and consumer welfare . . . .”11 
But the other goals did not disappear in the United States. 
Instead, they either have become the responsibility of other arms 
of government or have become the object of legislative attention. 
National security is the mission of the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”); jobs are the province 
of the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Trade 
Representative; small business is the responsibility of the Small 
Business Administration; the environment is the realm of the 
Environmental Protection Agency; diversity of viewpoints is an 
objective of the Federal Communications Commission; and so 
forth.  Dispersion of economic and political power has become  
9 Id. 
10 Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
International Antitrust Enforcement: Progress Made; Work To Be Done 4 (Sept. 12, 
2014) (“We must continue to seek broad international consensus on the principle 
that enforcement decisions be based solely on the competitive effects and consumer 
benefits of the transaction or conduct being reviewed. We must ensure that 
enforcement decisions are not used to promote domestic or industrial policy goals, 
protect state-owned or domestic companies from foreign competitors, or create 
leverage in international trade negotiations.”). 
11 Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 16.1, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/sites/default 
/files/TPP-Final-Text-Competition.pdf (not yet in effect). President Trump withdrew 
the United States as a signatory to the Trans-Pacific Partnership and from the 
negotiating process. Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017). 
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largely a political issue, attracting growing attention within 
Congress, academia, and the nation’s think tanks, not to mention 
political campaigns.12 
It should be noted that the triumph of the consumer welfare 
standard in America has not meant that other goals are never 
advanced by antitrust enforcement in the United States.  Such 
goals as health and safety, job creation, and national security all  
have been advanced by antitrust enforcement in certain 
instances, but only as a byproduct, when those goals coincided 
with promoting consumer welfare.13 
12 See, e.g., Binyamin Applebaum, Yellen Warns Global Strife Could Brake U.S. 
Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2016; Mohamed A. El-Erian, Opinion, The Fed Can’t 
Save the Economy This Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2016. 
13 For example, current U.S. antitrust law is sufficiently pragmatic to recognize 
that in some instances, non-economic goals must be served in order to permit 
competition to exist at all. In the Professional Engineers case, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that in certain instances—although not in that case—goals such as 
safeguarding public health and safety require exceptions from normal antitrust 
rules to assure that products can successfully be brought to market and compete. 
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686–87, 692 (1978). In the 
Broadcast Music case, the Court recognized that exceptions sometimes must be 
made to permit the creation of products or services that would not otherwise exist. 
Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1979). This was not a departure 
but rather an acknowledgement that consumer welfare cannot be maximized if 
products cannot otherwise be created or continue to be sold. See also Polk Bros., Inc. 
v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985); Business Review
Letter 06-3 from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Antitrust Div., to Steven John Fellman, Counsel for Linen Systems for Healthcare,
LLC (Aug. 8, 2006) (approving of proposed joint venture of regional textile
maintenance companies to market textile rental and laundry services to specialized
health care client); Business Review Letter 00-5 from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Garret G. Rasmussen, Counsel for
Containers America, LLC (Mar. 8, 2000) (approving of proposed creation and
operation of joint selling and purchasing vehicle for five regional manufacturers of
steel drums). See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000).
Likewise, antitrust enforcement aimed at promoting consumer welfare sometimes
results in a larger number of productive jobs and prevention of concentration of
economic power. For instance, blocking a merger that would have resulted in too
much concentration is likely to save efficient jobs that otherwise would have been
eliminated, while preventing further consolidation of economic power. Eliminating
practices that foreclose the entry of new competitors into a market is likely to foster
the growth of small business and the creation of jobs, while dissipating incumbents’
power over the market. Advancing consumer welfare can even advance national
security. Recently, the Defense Department threatened to ask Congress for special
legislation to elevate national security concerns over consumer welfare concerns in
order to prevent the Justice Department from approving too many mergers of
defense contractors, but the Justice Department assured the Defense Department
that a proper assessment of consumer welfare would result in the desired outcome.
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To be sure, these incidental effects are meaningful, but not 
everyone in America has been in agreement that this goes far 
enough to protect the American public or that consumer welfare 
should be treated as the only recognized goal of antitrust law. 
The 2016 Democratic Party Platform, for example, declared 
support for what it termed the “historic purpose” of the antitrust 
laws, “to protect competition and prevent excessively 
consolidated economic and political power.”14  The prevention of 
excessively consolidated political power may have been an 
objective of American antitrust law once, but it had not been a 
professed goal of U.S. enforcers for years.15 
Even broader goals have been proposed in Congress. 
Legislation has been introduced to inject a “net benefit” test, 
similar to one that already applies in Canada, into reviews of 
mergers, acquisitions, and other investments resulting in control 
by foreign interests.16  Under this legislation, titled the “Foreign 
Investment and Economic Security Act,” the mission of CFIUS 
would be expanded to include not only reviewing covered 
transactions to determine the effect on “national security,” but 
also to determine whether the transaction is of “net benefit” to 
the United States.  This review would include weighing negative 
effects against positive effects based on a variety of factors, 
including employment, resource processing, utilization of parts 
made in America, effect on productivity, technology transfers, 
innovation in the United States, competition within the United 
States, competition between the United States and other 
countries, compatibility with U.S. industrial policy, compatibility 
with U.S. cultural policy, whether a foreign person participating 
In a joint statement, the Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department 
explained that if a transaction has the potential to adversely affect national security 
by lessening competition, the antitrust agencies “will not hesitate to take 
appropriate enforcement action.” FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
JOINT STATEMENT ON PRESERVING COMPETITION IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY (Apr. 
12, 2016). 
14 2016 Democratic Platform, DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM. 11, http://s3.amazonaw 
s.com/uploads.democrats.org/Downloads/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf (last visited Apr.
3, 2017).
15 Id. And, of course, if changes in the goals of antitrust law are to be made 
without amending the statutes, on the theory that broader goals already are part of 
the original intent behind the antitrust laws, the agencies will not achieve much 
unless the judiciary agrees with their interpretation of those laws. It may be true 
that historically the courts recognized antitrust goals beyond consumer welfare, but 
more recent precedents have hardly embraced this position. 
16 H.R. 5665, 114th Cong. § 3 (2016). 
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in the transaction is controlled by a foreign government, and 
whether that person adheres to U.S. principles of corporate 
governance and law.17 
On September 15, 2016, sixteen members of the United 
States Congress—both Democrat and Republican—sent a letter 
to the head of the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) 
requesting a report from that office on whether the mandate of 
CFIUS should be broadened to add a form of net benefit test and 
whether the definition of national security should be broadened 
to address concerns about control of “the media and ‘soft power’ 
institutions.”18  On September 30, 2016, the GAO responded that 
it would initiate a review in 2017.19 
Other observers have championed the inclusion of still other 
goals in antitrust enforcement.  On June 29, 2016, Senator 
Elizabeth Warren delivered a speech that attracted considerable 
coverage in which she stated that concentrated markets can 
harm small businesses and result in both “concentrated political 
power” and the decline of the middle class.20  The “original 
purpose” of the antitrust laws, she said, “was to fight 
concentrated economic and political power.”21  She cited reports 
published at about the same time as her speech by the Center for 
American Progress and the Roosevelt Institute, the latter of 
which advocated a “public interest standard for enforcement 
actions.”22 
The Center for American Progress’s report, Reviving 
Antitrust, concluded that market power “distorts the distribution 
of income and the allocation of resources, reduces incentives for 
innovation, and underwrites . . . manipulation of political and 
17 Id. 
18 Letter from Rep. Robert Pittenger et al., House of Representatives, to Hon. 
Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller Gen., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (Sept. 15, 2016). 
19 Letter from Katherine Siggerud, Managing Dir. of Cong. Relations, U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, to Rep. Robert Pittenger, House of Representatives (Sept. 30, 
2016). 
20 Senator Elizabeth Warren, Keynote Remarks at New America’s Open 
Markets Program Event: Reigniting Competition in the American Economy (June 
29, 2016). 
21 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
22 Id. (quoting ROOSEVELT INST., UNTAMED: HOW TO CHECK CORPORATE, 
FINANCIAL, AND MONOPOLY POWER 20 (Nell Abernathy, Mike Konczal & Kathryn 
Milani eds., 2016)). 
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regulatory systems.”23  Among the solutions it proposed was the 
appointment of a deputy director for competition policy within 
the National Economic Council (“NEC”), with responsibility to 
keep the President and the Director of the NEC informed of 
economic trends and to “push policies beyond antitrust 
enforcement to ensure strong competition.”24 
The Roosevelt Institute report advocated revising the 
antitrust statutes in general and the government’s merger 
guidelines in particular “to promote a ‘public interest’ or ‘citizen 
interest’ standard.”25  A new statute could “requir[e] agencies to 
consider not just narrow price effects but also issues such as 
market openness, competition, and innovation,” as well as a 
company’s power over workers, and “the stability of global supply 
chains and the financial system.”26 
An article published in August 2016, under the auspices of 
the American Antitrust Institute similarly blamed increased 
economic concentration for rising inequality, the decline of small 
business, the decline in job creation, and “a corrosive effect on 
democracy.”27  The remedy it proposed was to “[r]einstate the 
broader set of aims that once guided antitrust, balancing 
efficiency goals with other objectives, including a commitment to 
open markets in which small businesses have a fair opportunity 
to compete.”28 
At the same time, and apart from advocating changes to the 
goals of antitrust, lawmakers, including both Democrats and 
Republicans, began calling for stronger antitrust enforcement as 
a means of revitalizing the economy.  At a notable Senate 
hearing in March 2016, Senators from both sides of the aisle 
questioned the leaders of the FTC and the Justice Department as 
to whether they were doing enough to enforce the antitrust 
laws.29  These lawmakers did not propose that antitrust enforcers 
23 MARC JARSULIC ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, REVIVING ANTITRUST: WHY 
OUR ECONOMY NEEDS A PROGRESSIVE COMPETITION POLICY 22 (2016). 
24 Id. at 20. 
25 ROOSEVELT INST., UNTAMED: HOW TO CHECK CORPORATE, FINANCIAL, AND 
MONOPOLY POWER 20 (Nell Abernathy, Mike Konczal & Kathryn Milani eds., 2016). 
26 Id. at 21, 23. 
27 Stacy Mitchell, The View from the Shop—Antitrust and the Decline of 
America’s Independent Businesses, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 498, 511 (2016). 
28 Id. at 515. 
29 Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016). 
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necessarily should adopt new goals, but that more vigorous 
enforcement itself would advance goals beyond consumer welfare, 
including the creation of jobs, reduction of the United States’ 
trade imbalances, stemming the outflow of capital from the 
United States, and combating wealth inequality.30  Antitrust 
enforcement also became an issue in the 2016 Presidential  
campaign, with Hillary Clinton calling for stronger enforcement 
and Donald Trump raising the prospect of blocking certain 
transactions.31 
This has sparked a debate over just how much antitrust 
enforcement is needed.  Exactly how much antitrust enforcement 
would it take to advance these objectives significantly?  Every 
known price-fixing conspiracy is already being prosecuted. 
Should the enforcers hire more investigators to search out 
conspiracies?  If so, how many?  Every merger of significant size 
is already being reported in advance.  Should smaller mergers be 
made reportable?  Should the enforcers lower the bar for bringing 
a challenge?  If so, by how much?  Should enforcers bring more 
cases challenging single-firm conduct that may be foreclosing 
competitors?  Which ones?  Should the definition of “monopoly 
power” be changed to reach unilateral conduct by companies with 
smaller market shares?  Should enforcers try to reinstitute per se 
rules against potentially exclusionary practices such as tying? 
Per se rules create certainty and foster compliance but  
30 Id. 
31 An October 3, 2016, speech by Hillary Clinton in Toledo, Ohio included the 
following statement:  “As president, I will appoint tough, independent authorities to 
strengthen anti-trust enforcement and really scrutinize mergers and acquisitions, so 
the big don’t keep getting bigger and bigger.” Daniel White, Read Hillary Clinton’s 
Remarks From a Rally in Toledo, Ohio, TIME (Oct. 3, 2016), http://time.com/4517335 
/hillary-clinton-transcript-toledo-ohio. Also in October 2016, Donald Trump criticized 
AT&T’s proposed acquisition of Time Warner as an example of a “power structure” 
rigged against the public. See Malathi Nayak et al., Time Warner Shares Fall on 
Worries Trump May Block AT&T Deal; Bankers See M&A Pause, BUS. STANDARD 
(Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.business-standard.com/article/reuters/time-warner-shares 
-fall-on-worries-trump-may-block-at-t-deal-bankers-see-m-a-pause-116110901722_1
.html. In May 2016, Mr. Trump told Sean Hannity of Fox News that Amazon’s Jeff
Bezos has “got a huge antitrust problem because he’s controlling so much, Amazon is
controlling so much of what they are doing.” See Trump Says Washington Post
Owner Bezos Has 'Huge Antitrust Problem,' FOX NEWS (May 13, 2016),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/05/13/trump-says-washington-post-owner-bez
os-has-huge-antitrust-problem.html.
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sometimes at the risk of being overkill.  With a few exceptions, 
the proposals for greater enforcement have not been specific,32 
but the sentiment is unmistakable. 
This rash of dialogue represented a fascinating turn of 
events, given that the goals of antitrust law have not captured 
the public’s attention in years.  Yet, even as the significance of  
this debate has grown, it remains only half the story.  It is 
equally important to recognize that the debate over the goals of 
antitrust law is not taking place in a geographic vacuum. 
The United States may have elevated consumer welfare to 
become the singular goal of competition law, but not every 
jurisdiction sees it this way.  Some foreign jurisdictions explicitly 
integrate goals beyond consumer welfare into their competition 
laws.33  Some nations include the goal of “national interest,” 
which encompasses not only the control of national defense 
assets but also the control of strategically important enterprises, 
such as financial institutions, utilities, agriculture and food 
processors.34  Some include the goal of job creation and 
preservation, sometimes requiring pledges of job security as a 
prerequisite to approval of transactions.35  Some include the goal 
of promoting minority ownership opportunities or cultural 
preservation.36 
And some include the goal of combating government 
subsidies that provide an advantage to certain companies over 
others.  In the European Union, such subsidization is called 
“state aid,” and as companies like Apple have learned, combating 
state aid is an integral goal of the European Competition 
Commission.37  If a country provides subsidies in the form of tax 
32 See ROOSEVELT INST., supra note 25, at 20. The Roosevelt Institute, for one, 
advocates favoring presumptions and per se rules over the rule of reason and calls 
upon the agencies to bring more cases challenging unilateral conduct. 
33 See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. 
Antitrust Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497, 2510, 2513 (2013). 
34 Report of the Task Force on Foreign Investment Review 2015 A.B.A. SEC. 
ANTITRUST L. 63. 
35 Id. at 1, 48. 
36 Id. at 1. 
37 See European Commission Press Release, IP/16/2923, State Aid: Ireland Gave 
Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple Worth Up to €13 Billion (Aug. 30, 2016); Brett Molina, 
Apple Appeals EU’s $14B Ruling on Irish Taxes, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2016 10:09 
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/12/19/apple-ireland-appeal-eus 
-14-billion-tax-ruling/95606010/. The Commission’s decision was appealed at the end
of 2016.
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breaks or direct aid to a company operating within its borders, 
disadvantaging competitors elsewhere in the European Union, 
this is considered a competition issue, not just a tax issue.  In 
contrast, the United States does not even have a term for state 
aid, and incentives to lure companies from one state to another 
have become commonplace. 
What has emerged in the world today is a patchwork of 
competition laws, all with the goal of consumer welfare, but 
many with other goals as well.  A catalogue of these laws and 
these objectives can fill a book,38 but a few examples will 
illustrate the variety that exists. 
A core objective of the European Union’s competition law, 
first adopted in 1957, is the promotion of integration of the 
economies of the various EU member states.39  Combating 
artificial barriers and state aid that would give a competitor from 
one member state an advantage over competitors from other 
member states was and is integral to this goal. 
The competition regimes of numerous countries include a 
range of goals.40  In South Africa, for example, the competition 
law requires consideration of a multitude of factors, including not 
only consumer welfare, but such national interest concerns as 
employment prospects and the impact on less developed regions 
of the country.41  This is markedly different from the pure 
consumer welfare standard being applied by antitrust agencies in 
the United States.  In addition, not every jurisdiction assigns 
responsibility for pursuing economic goals in the same way as the 
United States. 
Some, like China and South Africa, entrust their competition 
authorities with responsibility for pursuing multiple goals and 
balancing each against the others.42  South Africa has issued 
38 See A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 34, at ii; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), Public Interest Considerations in Merger 
Control, at 4, DAF/COMP/WP3(2016)3 (June 30, 2016); INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITION NETWORK: UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GRP., REPORT ON THE 
OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/ 
SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 2 (2007). 
39 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union arts. 101–02, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326). 
40 See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK: UNILATERAL CONDUCT 
WORKING GRP., supra note 38, Annex A; OECD, supra note 38, at 7. 
41 See Competition Act 89 of 1998, GN 1392 of GG 19412 (30 Oct. 1998). 
42 See OECD, supra note 38, at 7, 9; see also Notice of the General Office of the 
State Council on Launching the Security Review System for Mergers and 
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extensive guidelines explaining how such an analysis should be 
performed in reviewing mergers.43  This includes an assessment 
as to whether a merger should be rejected on “public interest” 
grounds, considering its impact on employment, small business, 
disadvantaged populations, and the competitiveness of South 
African industries. 
Some jurisdictions, like Canada and Australia, assign 
different agencies or officials the tasks of assessing different 
economic goals.  For example, in Canada, the Competition 
Commission is responsible for protecting competition while the 
Minister of Industry and the Minister of Canadian Heritage are 
responsible for assuring that investments in Canada are of “net 
benefit” to the nation and will not harm its national heritage.44  
In Australia, the Competition and Consumer Commission is 
responsible for protecting competition while the Treasurer, with 
the advice of a Foreign Investment Review Board, is responsible 
for assuring that investments in Australia are not contrary to the 
“national interest,” taking into account a range of goals, which 
include, but are not limited to, protecting competition.45 
Typically, any one of these agencies or officials is authorized 
to prohibit a practice or a transaction, regardless of how the 
others rule, so that if any agency or official disapproves, the 
practice or transaction is disallowed.  For example, in Australia, 
the Competition Commission approved the acquisition of 
Australia’s largest grain producer, GrainCorp, by a U.S.-based 
company, Archer-Daniels-Midland (“ADM”), in 2013, but  
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (promulgated by the Gen. 
Office of the St. Council, Feb. 3, 2011, effective Mar. 5, 2011) (China); Provisions of 
the Ministry of Commerce for the Implementation of the Security Review System for 
Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (promulgated 
by the Ministry of Commerce, Aug. 25, 2011, effective Sept. 1, 2011) Sept. 8, 2011 
(China). 
43 E.g., Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in Merger 
Regulation under the Competition Act 89 of 1998, GN 309 of GG 40039 (31 May 
2016). 
44 See Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 28. 
45 About the ACCC, AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, 
https://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/australian-competition-consumer-commission/ab 
out-the-accc (last visited Apr. 4, 2017); Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 
(Cth) s 67 (Austl.).  
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Australia’s Treasurer subsequently prohibited the deal on the 
recommendation of the nation’s Foreign Investment Review 
Board.46 
In some jurisdictions, a minister or equivalent official may 
reject a decision made by the competition commission and either 
disapprove something the commission has approved or approve 
something that the commission has disapproved.  In Germany, 
the Competition Commission (the Bundeskartellamt) decided to 
block the acquisition of grocery chain Kaiser’s Tengelmann by 
another grocery chain, Edeka, but the Minister of the Economy 
overruled the Commission and allowed the acquisition to proceed 
on the condition that Edeka protect the jobs of Kaiser 
Tengelmann’s 16,000 employees for at least five years.47  In 
Spain, the competition authority decided to block the merger of 
gas and electricity companies Gas Natural and Endesa, but the 
Council of Ministers overruled the authority and cleared the 
deal, with conditions.48 
Sometimes, different arms of government endeavor to 
coordinate the timing of their deliberations in order to avoid the 
awkwardness of conflicting decisions of this kind.49 
How did we get to such a wide variety of approaches?  In the 
United States, the first federal antitrust statute was adopted in 
1890.50  Although a handful of countries had competition laws 
prior to World War II, most were adopted later.  Not all countries 
had the same economic priorities, and not all had the same type 
of legal system.  This resulted in a variety of objectives.  The 
United States, with its common law tradition, free market 
economy, and abundant resources, was not in the same position 
as every other country.  In Europe, a different legislative model 
emerged and nations around the world tended to adopt laws  
46 See OECD, supra note 38, at 14. 
47 See Regulators Overruled in Supermarket Takeover, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 
17, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/regulators-overruled-in-supermarket-takeover/a-19 
122420. 
48 See OECD, supra note 38, at 15. 
49 For example, in 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal 
Communications Commission conducted investigations of the proposed acquisition 
by AT&T of T-Mobile USA during the same period of time. 
50 The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Apr. 4, 
2017). 
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based on the U.S. model, the European model, or some 
combination of the two, with countless variations and 
innovations. 
At first, each nation’s laws had limited impact in other 
jurisdictions.  Although there was a great deal of discussion 
within academic circles about “harmonization” of these laws, or 
even real “convergence,” genuine differences remain.  Occasional 
efforts to craft a universal competition code all have resulted in 
failure.51  There has been productive research conducted within 
the International Competition Network, an organization of 
competition agencies from around the world, together with study 
in other quarters, including the OECD and the World Bank 
Group, but most of this work so far has focused on cataloging the 
differences that exist among jurisdictions, rather then on 
reconciling them.52 
With economic globalization, however, it has become 
increasingly difficult to contain the impact of each nation’s 
competition law within that nation’s borders.  Mergers and 
acquisitions of any consequence spill across multiple countries. 
Practices such as licensing restrictions or exclusivity agreements 
often apply to multiple jurisdictions.  For agencies enforcing 
these laws and corporations trying to adopt global practices or 
close global transactions, the disharmony has become more than 
an academically interesting phenomenon and can be downright 
frustrating. 
More than that, for governments confronting asymmetrical 
enforcement goals among nations, the disharmony has become a 
political problem.  For how long can a country like the United 
States adhere to a pristine antitrust standard of consumer 
welfare when its trading partners are pursuing other goals like 
“national interest” in enforcing their own competition laws, 
especially when these goals that can exclude American-based 
companies from opportunities that their competitors based 
abroad would be permitted to take advantage of in the United 
States? 
51 See Richard M. Steuer, Antitrust Overhaul, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 681, 681 
(2015). 
52 ICN Factsheet and Key Messages, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc608.pdf. 
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Yet, that is where America finds itself today.  American-
based ADM was prevented from acquiring Australia’s GrainCorp 
under Australia’s “national interest” test and before that Coca-
Cola was prevented from acquiring one of China’s leading juice 
manufacturers under China’s public interest test.53  Around the 
same time, however, a Chinese company was permitted to 
acquire America’s largest pork producer, Smithfield Foods, 
because, among other things, the United States had no “national 
interest” test.54  That deal was closely scrutinized in Congress 
and elsewhere, but it did not violate the antitrust laws under the 
consumer welfare test or threaten national security, as that 
concept was being interpreted, and was allowed to close.55  This is 
not to say that the Smithfield deal necessarily was contrary to 
America’s national interest, but that although there was 
widespread public concern, there was no mechanism to subject 
the transaction to a national interest review. 
So, what is the right direction for the future?  The issues 
confronting the United States today are which goals to pursue, 
who should be responsible for pursuing these goals, and how, 
when these goals conflict, should they be prioritized and 
balanced.  This sounds simple enough, until taking a closer look 
at the choices that would need to be made. 
I. WHICH GOALS TO CHOOSE?
What should be the goals of antitrust law in the United 
States?  Consumer welfare is a given.  There is no disagreement 
that low prices, high quality, and high output at low cost should 
be a key goal. 
Keeping a lid on the concentration of economic and political 
power is considerably more controversial.  Often, the goal of 
safeguarding consumer welfare requires limiting concentration, 
as when a merger is disallowed or a monopoly is broken up to 
prevent supracompetitive prices.  But if limiting concentration of 
53 See Hard to Swallow: China Indicates the Real Targets of its Anti-Monopoly 
Law: Outsiders, ECONOMIST, (Mar. 21, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/133 
31326. 
54 Parija Kavilanz, China’s Expensive Love Affair with Pork, CNN: MONEY (May 
29, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/29/news/companies/smithfield-foods/index. 
55 Shuanghui International Holdings Ltd. acquired Smithfield Foods in 2013 for 
$4.7 billion. Dana Mattioli, et al., China Makes Biggest U.S. Play, WALL ST. J. (May 
30, 2013, 7:42 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324412 
604578512722044165756.  
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power were recognized as a goal unto itself, would the amount of 
permissible concentration in markets be the same as it would be 
today?  If four competitors are sufficient to assure competitive 
prices in a market, are four enough to assure the minimum level 
of concentration of economic and political power?  How would 
that be measured? 
There are two principal means to combat concentration: 
prevent mergers and break up dominant companies.  If 
containing the degree of economic and political power existing in 
a market were an independent goal of antitrust enforcement, 
enforcers and courts theoretically would be empowered, under 
the antitrust laws, to block a merger that is not expected to 
create the power to raise prices or reduce output, and is not 
expected to facilitate collusion to fix prices, limit output, or divide 
customers, but nevertheless is expected to lead to an undesirable 
level of political power.  Would political power be measured 
within relevant markets, as with consumer welfare analysis, or 
would market definition be less relevant?  If the nation’s largest 
automaker wanted to merge with the nation’s largest food 
producer and the nation’s largest telecom provider, at what point 
would this result in too much power, regardless of whether there 
would be a likely impact on prices or output in any relevant 
market?  What if all three were being acquired by some other 
country’s sovereign wealth fund?  Without a yardstick, the 
answers are likely to depend on which administration is in power 
at any time under a test of “I know it when I see it.”56  Some may 
find this acceptable and, of course, any interpretation of the 
antitrust laws would be subject to review in the courts, which 
would need to agree with that interpretation, but predictability 
would be diminished. 
In reality, much of the concern that has been expressed over 
the concentration of power today stems from remorse over the 
approval of various large mergers in years past,57 and there is 
only so much that antitrust enforcement can accomplish to undo 
those deals.  Assuming that such remorse is warranted, the most 
56 Cf., Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. New York, 881 F. Supp. 860, 869–70 & n.5 
(W.D.N.Y. 1994) (“customers know a department store when they see it” (citing 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring))). 
57 See, e.g., Justin Elliott, The American Way, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 11, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/airline-consolidation-democratic-lobbying-antitr 
ust. 
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meaningful answer is to make antitrust enforcement vigorous 
enough going forward to prevent this from happening again. 
Despite the recent criticism, antitrust enforcement actually has 
grown stronger over the past several years,58 and this has 
resulted not only in stopping or trimming some major deals and 
practices, but also in averting other deals and practices in 
lawyers’ offices before they ever progress beyond the talking 
stage.59 
As for undoing completed mergers and acquisitions that, in 
retrospect, seem ill-considered, these are harder to tackle.  There 
is some precedent for challenging acquisitions that were 
completed years before and were never reviewed.  Theoretically, 
it even would be possible for the enforcement agencies to 
challenge a deal that they did review and allowed to close long 
before.60  Conduct and conditions change, and in compelling 
cases, an ex post challenge could succeed.  Unless such 
challenges were numerous and largely successful, however, they 
would do little to change the face of the American economy. 
As for attacking size itself, the National Commission for the 
Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures issued a 
recommendation in 1979 for the adoption of a “no-fault 
monopolization” standard under which enforcers could obtain 
relief in monopolization cases without the need to prove willful 
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, which is the 
current standard.61  Instead, the new standard would have 
required a court, upon a showing of “persistent monopoly power,” 
to formulate a plan to dissipate that power, on the assumption 
that “persistent monopoly power, in all but the most exceptional 
instance, can only result from culpable conduct.”62  The proposal 
had its proponents but ultimately failed to win much support, 
58 See Loretta E. Lynch, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Keynote Luncheon 
Address at the 64th Annual American Bar Association Antitrust Law Spring 
Meeting (Apr. 6, 2016).  
59 Id. 
60 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957) 
(explaining that the legality of an acquisition may be determined at “any time when 
the acquisition threatens to ripen into a prohibited effect”). 
61 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); NAT’L 
COMM’N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 156, 410 (1979). 
62 NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, supra 
note 61, at 156. 
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even from enforcers themselves.63  Today, the prospect of 
authorizing suits to break up existing corporations for 
dominating too large a share of a relevant market, regardless of 
whether it can be proved that they engaged in willful acquisition 
or maintenance of their market power, seems no more realistic 
an option than it was in 1979.  Moreover, even if a few mega-
companies were broken up, this would affect only a handful of 
industries, and the overall effect might well be more symbolic 
than real. 
To be realistic, if the political power of dominant companies 
is of serious concern to lawmakers today, the antitrust laws can 
provide only a partial solution.  Antitrust enforcement can limit 
the power of corporations going forward, and the containment of 
political power is a foreseeable side effect of vigorous antitrust 
enforcement, but antitrust enforcers alone can do only so much to 
limit existing corporate power either by stepping up enforcement 
against future acts or by trying to break up past mergers and 
existing monopolies. 
What about jobs?  If creating and preserving jobs were a 
discrete goal of antitrust enforcement, enforcers and courts 
theoretically could block a merger or outlaw a practice that 
impedes the preservation of jobs, even if there were little 
prospect of an adverse impact on consumer welfare.  This 
theoretically could happen in South Africa,64 although under 
South Africa’s new guidelines, it is possible for merging 
companies to justify a loss of jobs by showing that only by 
reducing employment can the companies reduce prices to 
consumers.  But again, how would one measure the anticipated 
effect on employment?  Relative to the total employment in the 
same market, or industry, or in the country as a whole?  If a 
merger or practice is expected to have little adverse effect on 
consumer welfare but is expected to result in jobs being 
eliminated or shipped abroad, how can the impact on jobs be 
measured in a way that can be compared to the effect on prices 
and output? 
63 Milton Handler & Richard M. Steuer, Attempts to Monopolize and No-Fault 
Monopolization, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 190 n.262 (1980). 
64 See Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in Merger 
Regulation under the Competition Act 89 of 1998, GN 309 of GG 40039, at 5.6 (31 
May 2016). 
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To complicate matters further, we know that a reduction in 
factory jobs can have the ripple effect of eliminating jobs in 
support products and services, from restaurants and dry cleaners 
to residential housing and police departments.  How should this 
be taken into account?  On the other hand, the preservation of 
inefficient jobs can be a drag on the economy in the long term, 
not a benefit.  Should this be taken into account and, if so, how 
can it be measured?  Experience teaches that preservation of 
inefficient jobs rarely benefits an economy for very long. 
What about small business?  If the Jeffersonian tradition of 
preserving small farmers and small merchants is to be carried 
on, enforcers and courts theoretically could block mergers or 
outlaw practices that could be expected to impede the entry, 
growth, and survival of small businesses, regardless of the effect 
on consumer welfare.  But how would “small business” be defined 
and how would one measure the impact of a transaction or 
practice on small businesses?  Preventing the foreclosure of 
competition already is a goal of antitrust law, encompassed 
within the concept of consumer welfare.  There is debate over 
whether enforcement against unilateral practices that foreclose 
smaller competitors has been effective enough,65 but no debate 
over whether combating foreclosure of competition already is a 
goal of antitrust law.  If protection of small business were made a 
discrete antitrust goal unto itself, could enforcers and courts 
prevent transactions and practices that would not result in 
higher prices or less output, but still would jeopardize the 
survival of some smaller competitors?  How would such impact be 
measured and what weight should it be given?  We have some 
precedent in the form of the Robinson-Patman Act—which was 
65 The treatment of unilateral conduct has been hotly debated within the United 
States. In 2016, the Roosevelt Institute recommended that America’s antitrust 
agencies “should litigate to test the boundaries of the law and to alert monopolist 
firms that certain conduct (i.e., tying/bundling practices, predatory pricing, exclusive 
dealing) will be closely scrutinized.” See ROOSEVELT INST., supra note 25, at 22. The 
2016 report of the Center for American Progress included the observation that “there 
have been few challenges to unilateral actions to expand or preserve market power 
by those who have it,” and recommended that both the FTC and the Department of 
Justice try building on past precedents to bring a greater number of unilateral 
conduct cases. See JARSULIC ET AL., supra note 23, at 2, 17. Similarly, the article 
published under the auspices of the American Antitrust Institute in August 2016, 
urged that America “[d]o more to address market power . . . by taking more 
enforcement actions against companies that unilaterally harm competition.” See 
Mitchell, supra note 27, at 42. 
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enacted during the Great Depression to protect small 
businesses—but the Supreme Court recently instructed that in 
most cases even this act should be interpreted to require injury 
to competition itself, not just to small businesses.66 
What about other goals?  If such goals as protection of the 
environment or the rights of indigenous peoples were among the 
goals of American antitrust law, antitrust enforcers and courts 
theoretically could block a deal that would not be expected to 
adversely affect consumer welfare but would threaten these other 
objectives.  How could these variables be measured and weighed? 
Other countries do it, so it can be done, but it would add 
additional layers of complexity and uncertainty, and force 
antitrust enforcers to make judgments about entirely unfamiliar 
issues. 
What about “national interest?”  If protecting national 
interest were a separate goal of antitrust enforcement, antitrust 
enforcers theoretically could block an acquisition that would 
unduly threaten a critical national interest, such as control over 
the nation’s food supply, financial markets, energy, 
transportation, or communications, regardless of the acquisition’s 
anticipated effect on consumer welfare.  But how would an 
enforcer or other official assess a threat to national interest? 
Would it depend on the nationality of the acquirer?  That is not 
always easy to establish.67  Would it depend on whether the 
acquirer is a private business or individual, or a state-owned 
enterprise or sovereign wealth fund?  How would one measure a 
threat to national interest?  Would it somehow be weighed 
against consumer welfare, and where would the line be drawn? 
One answer is that if CFIUS already can measure national 
security concerns, it should be possible to measure national 
interest concerns.  Another answer is that if other countries’ 
competition agencies can do it, including China’s and South 
Africa’s, U.S. officials theoretically should be able to do it too. 
66 See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 181 
(2006) (“[W]e would resist interpretation geared more to the protection of existing 
competitors than to the stimulation of competition.”). 
67 See, e.g., Michael Forsythe & Jonathan Ansfield, A Chinese Mystery: Who 
Owns a Firm on a Global Shopping Spree?, N.Y. TIMES: DEAL BOOK (Sept. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/business/dealbook/anbang-global-shopping-
spree-china-mystery-ownership.html. 
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And what about state aid?  If subsidization of U.S.-based 
companies is becoming an issue abroad, can the United States 
ignore subsidization of foreign-based competitors?  How would 
this be incorporated into an antitrust analysis?  And what about 
tax breaks offered by states, counties, and municipalities within 
the United States?  Would limitations on domestic tax subsidies 
even be constitutional? 
These are hard questions.  There is a preference among 
many enforcers and scholars for measurable criteria for 
conducting antitrust analysis.  Measurable variables, such as 
concentration ratios and price elasticity, are usually favored over 
such variables as changes in political power or national interest. 
Econometricians routinely participate in antitrust deliberations, 
but not political economists.  Nevertheless, to exclude factors 
that are difficult to measure may concede too much in the 
interest of expediency and may place the United States at a 
disadvantage with respect to other jurisdictions.  For example, if 
a merger poses a borderline threat to prices and output, but is 
almost certain to result in a substantial increase in the power to 
influence government decisions affecting the industry or a 
substantial loss of jobs, is this something that American antitrust 
enforcers should be required to ignore?  If they must ignore it, 
who will review it?  Congress cannot prevent a merger on its 
own, and today, unless the industry is subject to another 
regulatory authority or there is a national security issue, no 
authority will weigh in. 
So, what is the answer?  The antitrust laws already contain 
the kernels of many of the goals under discussion and, 
theoretically, many of these goals could be characterized as 
having an impact on consumer welfare in the long run to some 
extent.  If political power becomes too concentrated, firms might 
have greater opportunity to engage in lobbying and regulatory 
capture and ultimately to raise prices to consumers above a 
competitive level.  If jobs in America disappear, this not only may 
harm consumer welfare through higher prices commanded by 
foreign producers, but also may harm producer welfare by 
contracting demand.68  If small businesses are foreclosed from 
competing, innovation might be stifled and consumers might be 
68 See Richard M. Steuer, Jobs and Antitrust, 23 ANTITRUST MAG. 98, 101 
(2009). 
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denied better products at lower prices.  These often are 
theoretical and speculative outcomes, to be sure, none of which 
likely would be sufficient in itself to enable an antitrust enforcer 
to win a case in court.  Yet in those cases where the applicable 
standard is threatened harm to competition, which is the 
standard applicable to mergers and to practices that foreclose 
access to customers, rather than harm to competition that is 
already in progress, it might be appropriate to recognize these 
factors as “tie-breakers” in close cases. 
It is important in this context to recognize that there are two 
broad categories of antitrust offenses under U.S. law—those that 
require proof of an immediate anticompetitive effect, including 
per se offenses where that effect may be presumed from the 
conduct, and those that instead require proof of a threat to lessen 
competition.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions 
the effect of which “may be substantially to lessen competition, or 
to tend to create a monopoly.”69  Section 3 of the Clayton Act 
prohibits exclusive dealing and tying where the effect “may be to 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce.”70  In these latter instances, reference to a 
69 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
70 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012). In recent years, as a result of a series of court decisions 
and commentary summarizing those decisions, the incipiency doctrine has been 
marginalized to some degree, but it remains the law. For example, the antitrust 
treatise of the American Bar Association’s Section of Antitrust Law summarizes the 
court and Federal Trade Commission decisions as “effectively merging the mode of 
analysis” under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and 
Section 5 of the FTC Act into a rule of reason standard. 1 A.B.A. SEC. OF ANTITRUST 
L., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 214 (7th ed. 2012); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
& FED. TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1995) (citing Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 
Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1352 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“In evaluating transactions, the trend of 
recent authority is to use the same analysis employed in the evaluation of tying 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act to assess a defendant’s liability under Section 3 
of the Clayton Act.”). A proposed 2016 update of the Guidelines states that, “In 
evaluating transactions, courts use the same analysis employed in the evaluation of 
tying under Section 1 of the Sherman Act to assess a defendant’s liability under 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INT’L ENFORCEMENT & OPERATIONS 
(proposed Nov. 1, 2016). As authority, the new draft cites a Seventh Circuit opinion 
where the court observed, “Though some old cases say otherwise, the standards for 
adjudicating tying under the two statutes are now recognized to be the same.” 
Sheridan v. Marathon Petrol. Co., 530 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2008). However, none 
of the cases that Sheridan cites actually stands for the proposition that the 
incipiency doctrine no longer exists. Nor do any of the authorities relied on by those 
cases. See, e.g., 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
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“tie breaker” can inform the assessment of a threat to 
competition.  A tie-breaker approach is not unprecedented, and 
already is reflected in the horizontal merger guidelines issued by 
the U.S. Department of Justice and United States Federal Trade 
Commission.71  These guidelines take a skeptical view of 
efficiency defenses raised to justify mergers and acquisitions, but 
recognize that in close cases, a legitimate efficiencies argument 
can make the difference.72  Of course, there the tie breaker is a 
justification, not a threatened harm, but it is a tie breaker 
nevertheless. 
In close cases, the antitrust enforcers routinely hear an 
earful from legislators, interest groups, and the public about such 
factors as employment, concentration of power, and foreclosure of 
small businesses.73  While the enforcers do their best to shut this 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1719b (3d ed. 2011). 
Each case relies on an earlier case that draws upon both statutes but, upon analysis, 
not one of those precedents holds that the incipiency doctrine has been repealed. 
Even if any of them did, no judicial opinion—even that of the Supreme Court—can 
abrogate a Constitutional act of Congress. The fact is that although the elements of 
proof of an offense under Section 3 of the Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act (and Section 5 of the FTC Act) are largely the same—market power, 
conditioning, etc.—the degree to which a plaintiff must demonstrate that 
competition has been impeded is different. There is a material difference between 
needing to prove an unreasonable restraint of competition and needing to prove that 
the effect of a practice or transaction “may be” to substantially lessen competition or 
“tend to” create a monopoly. Indeed, Areeda & Hovenkamp explicitly acknowledge 
that, with regard to exclusive dealing, not all courts apply the same test under the 
Clayton Act and the Sherman Act, with “a probable majority of courts hold[ing] that 
the Clayton Act test is easier for a plaintiff to meet than the Sherman Act test.” Id. 
¶ 1719b n.22. See also id. ¶ 1800c4 (“In tying arrangement cases a few courts have 
followed the rule suggested in Times-Picayune of applying a more aggressive test 
under the Clayton Act than under the Sherman Act, but most apply the same test 
under both statutes. Clearly this would be the most sensible approach to exclusive 
dealing as well. Nevertheless, the cases are divided, with a likely majority stating 
that the Clayton Act requires a smaller showing of anticompetitive effects.”) 
(citations omitted). 
71 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 10 (2010). 
72 Id. (“The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the 
greater must be the cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must be passed 
through to customers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will not have an 
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. . . . In the Agencies’ experience, 
efficiencies are most likely to make a difference in merger analysis when the likely 
adverse competitive effects, absent the efficiencies, are not great.”). 
73 For example, when airline mergers were under review, labor unions and big-
city mayors tried to persuade the Justice Department not to challenge under the 
antitrust laws with the promise to preserve jobs in those cities. When hospital 
mergers were under review, the hospitals urged the FTC and Justice Department 
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out, these groups would not keep commenting unless they 
thought they were being heard.  Serious consideration needs to 
be given to acknowledging that in those instances where the legal 
standard is a “threatened” lessening of competition or 
“threatened” creation of monopoly power, evidence of such factors 
as threats to jobs and threats of excess political power 
legitimately may be considered in making antitrust decisions as 
to whether there is a demonstrable threat of long-term harm to 
consumer welfare.  To characterize these factors as “non-
economic” or “non-competition” factors, as some do,74 is to ignore 
the long-term impact they can have on consumer welfare.  Just 
because a factor is hard to measure or may take a longer time to 
impact competition is not reason enough to ignore it, if it bears 
on the purpose for having antitrust laws and the long-term 
health of competition. 
This does not mean that antitrust decisions should turn on 
the impact on political power, jobs, or small businesses if not 
accompanied by immediate or threatened harm to consumer 
welfare.  Making the containment of political power, the 
preservation of jobs, or the preservation of small businesses goals 
of antitrust enforcement in the absence of threatened harm to 
consumer welfare would do more harm than good.  Blocking 
mergers and breaking up companies when there is no real threat 
to competition under the consumer welfare standard would risk 
impeding economic progress.  Requiring the preservation of jobs 
as a discrete goal of antitrust, even if there is no threat to 
consumer welfare, would perpetuate unproductive jobs without 
creating productive jobs.  Such employment requirements have 
been imposed in other countries for limited periods of time and 
they can afford workers time to consider their options, but 
blocking a deal simply in order to perpetuate jobs is a recipe for 
inefficiency.  Likewise, making antitrust determinations solely 
for the purpose of preserving particular small competitors rather 
than preserving opportunities for competition itself—which of 
not to challenge with promises to freeze prices. When university agreements on 
scholarships and athletics were under review, the universities urged the Justice 
Department not to bring a challenge in order to preserve academic traditions. In 
each instance, the enforcement agencies tried their best to exclude these other 
factors and to focus exclusively on the anticipated effect on consumer welfare. 
74 Diane R. Hazel, Competition in Context: The Limitations of Using Competition 
Law as a Vehicle for Social Policy in the Developing World, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 275, 
306, 308 (2015). 
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course includes competition from small businesses—would be 
counterproductive.  Where there is no serious threat to consumer 
welfare, antitrust enforcement to contain political power, 
perpetuate jobs, or perpetuate small businesses is not an 
appropriate or particularly effective instrument.  At the same 
time, where the applicable standard is proof of a threat to lessen 
competition, and there is evidence of an appreciable threat of 
higher prices or diminished output, the added existence of 
demonstrable threats of excessive power, loss of jobs, or 
elimination of small businesses may help to confirm the threat to 
consumer welfare and the advisability of taking enforcement 
action. 
In contrast, national security and national interest concerns 
in the context of foreign investment review are in a category of 
their own.  Regardless of the impact on consumer welfare, there 
is a geopolitical dimension to these concerns that is not 
adequately reflected in the consumer welfare standard.  This is 
not to suggest that foreign investment in the United States 
should be discouraged or unreasonably limited, but in a world 
where most of America’s principal trading partners have imposed 
national interest barriers in one form or another, it would hardly 
be reckless for the United States to adopt a formal national 
interest mechanism of its own.  National interest tests already 
exist in Canada, Australia, China, Japan, Korea, and most of the 
countries in the European Union.  New legislation could be 
enacted to invest America’s antitrust authorities, or some other 
arm of government or an entirely new body, with responsibility 
for reviewing transactions on the basis of “national interest,” 
including any or all of the goals described earlier.75 
Another alternative is simply to take a more expansive view, 
under existing legislation, of the meaning of “national security” 
and the scope of the authority of CFIUS to review mergers, 
acquisitions, and takeovers by foreign persons that threaten or 
75 Congress could conduct hearings and adopt measures announcing its intent to 
either reaffirm or modify the goals of the antitrust laws. Congress has debated bills 
of this kind before, and could again. The Foreign Investment and Economic Security 
bill described earlier offers one model, embracing nearly every possible goal and 
resting ultimate decision-making power with a select committee and the president, 
but many other approaches are possible, as well. Alternatively, the enforcement 
agencies could announce their interpretation of the existing antitrust laws, with the 
courts having the last word as to whether that interpretation properly represents 
the intent of the Congress that enacted each of those laws. 
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impair national security.76  Already, CFIUS has interpreted 
national security to include investments not only in defense 
contractors but in the technology sector and strategic 
infrastructure.  Other nations take a similarly expansive view.77 
Still another route is to empower sector regulators having 
discretion to approve or disapprove a transaction in a sector of 
the economy with authority to consider national security or 
national interest on their own.  In the telecom industry, for 
example, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
regularly has been provided advice by “Team Telecom,” an 
informal working group including staff-level representatives of 
the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, 
and Department of Defense, which makes recommendations to 
the FCC concerning whether or not it should approve license 
applications that raise national security concerns.78  There is no 
statutory authority for this body or this process, but the FCC has 
discretion to approve or disapprove license applications and 
presumably is entitled to take advice as it sees fit in carrying out 
that responsibility.  Although such a process would not work in 
all sectors of the economy, it could be applied by any agency with 
comparable authority. 
Of course, in a real sense this is a trade issue more than it is 
an antitrust issue.  If the reason for adopting a “national 
interest” or “net benefits” test is that other countries are 
subjecting American-based companies to such tests, the ultimate 
76 The current authority is conferred pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(A)(i) 
(2012). See also Exec. Order No. 11858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975), amended 
by 31 C.F.R. § 800.101 (2016). 
77 Reportedly, the White House also considered a proposal to expand the scope of 
national security review in the context of the telecom industry to include review of 
transactions not involving foreign persons at all but still having an impact on 
national security. The National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (“NITA”), which is a division of the Department of Commerce that 
advises the White House regarding telecommunications policy issues, reportedly has 
proposed broadening the scope of reviews by Team Telecom, an interagency panel 
with representatives from the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Justice, 
State, and Treasury, together with representatives from the FBI and United States 
Trade Representative, to reach petitions that do not involve foreign ownership of 
U.S. carriers. See Jenna Ebersole, FCC OKs Team Telecom Review Process Reform 
Proposal, LAW360 (June 24, 2016, 3:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
810734/fcc-oks-team-telecom-review-process-reform-proposal. 
78 Proposed FCC Rules for Team Telecom Review of Applications with Foreign 
Ownership, Shorten Timeframes, Add Burdens, WOMBLE CARLYLE (June 30, 2016), 
http://www.wcsr.com/Insights/Alerts/2016/June/Proposed-FCC-Rules-for-Team-
Telecom-Review-of-Applications-with-Foreign-Ownership. 
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answer may lie in adopting an equivalent test and negotiating 
mutual exceptions.  Potentially, America could adopt a national 
interest test that provides a different standard for transactions 
involving entities from countries with which America has 
negotiated agreements, allowing American-based entities to 
invest in those countries without unreasonable limitations.79  
Without a national interest test of its own, however, the United 
States presumably would find it harder to negotiate agreements 
of this kind. 
Plainly, there is more than one possible approach for 
addressing national interest.  The only wrong answer would be 
not to confront the issue of asymmetrical barriers at all. 
II. WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR EACH GOAL?
If America’s goals are modified, who should take 
responsibility for them?  The current division of responsibility 
may work reasonably well in most instances, but it was not the 
product of some grand plan.  Rather, it was the result of 
incremental agency growth over the years. 
What should the division of responsibility be?  The 
possibilities include the following: (1) assigning each of multiple 
authorities responsibility for making an assessment of 
compatibility with a narrow set of goals; (2) assigning the 
competition authority responsibility for balancing all or most the 
goals; or (3) assigning another arm of government responsibility 
for balancing all or most of the goals. 
There are several models for these alternatives from which 
to choose.  First, assign each agency one or more goals, which 
could result in more than one agency assessing competition 
issues, and provide each agency the authority to veto a 
transaction or practice.  This is the model currently in effect in 
the United States and numerous other countries, which have 
competition agencies, national security agencies, and multiple 
specialized regulatory agencies, such as banking commissions, 
79 The September 15, 2016 letter from sixteen members of Congress to the GAO 
asked the GAO to report on whether the mandate of CFIUS should be broadened to 
“prohibit investment in a U.S. industry by a foreign company whose government 
prohibits foreign investment in that same industry.” Letter from Rep. Robert 
Pittenger et al., House of Respresentatives, to Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller 
Gen., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (Sept. 15, 2016). This proposal derived from 
the 2012 Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission. 
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communications commissions, energy commissions, and 
transportation commissions to exercise authority—sometimes 
exclusive authority—over transactions and practices involving 
entities within their areas of responsibility.  Second, assign each 
agency one or more goals but enable some agencies to override 
the vetoes of others, as occurred in Germany and Spain.  Third, 
assign the antitrust authorities responsibility for balancing 
multiple goals, as in South Africa and China. 
Lastly, assign the antitrust authorities responsibility for 
applying the consumer welfare standard and assign another 
authority, such as an expanded CFIUS, a new foreign investment 
review board, or the Secretary of Commerce, responsibility for 
balancing multiple goals under a “net benefit” or “national 
interest” test, as in Canada and Australia, with each authority 
having the power to disapprove a transaction or practice. 
In the United States, the dispersion of responsibility among 
multiple agencies has existed for some time, with each agency 
pursuing a somewhat different set of goals with some overlap. 
One can argue that the principle of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” 
would counsel to leave well enough alone in this respect, 
especially in a country like the United States, which can afford 
the expense of operating multiple regulatory agencies.  Although 
there are occasional conflicts between agencies, these are 
infrequent and tend to be worked out. 
Could there be greater coordination between and among 
agencies?  There already has been progress on this score, and 
more can be made, but if this is the course chosen improvements 
should be pursued.  One possibility is to appoint an official to act 
as liaison among agencies with authority to review transactions 
or practices, to help assure that the agencies do not act at cross 
purposes even if they do not have liaisons of their own.  In the 
same vein, on April 15, 2016, President Obama issued an 
executive order to all federal agencies directing them to identify 
specific actions they can take to detect anticompetitive behavior, 
to refer perceived antitrust offenses to the U.S. Justice 
Department and U.S. Federal Trade Commission when 
appropriate, and to identify actions they themselves can take 
within their own areas of responsibility to address undue 
burdens on competition.80 
80 Exec. Order No. 13725, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,417 (Apr. 15, 2016). 
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As described earlier, some countries assign their competition 
agencies responsibility for assessing and weighing not only 
consumer welfare, but other goals as well.  This can be daunting, 
but every town council and zoning board routinely faces the 
challenge of weighing competing goals, usually with far less 
analytical support.81  Nevertheless, the arguments against 
assigning competition agencies authority for applying other goals 
are that these agencies are ill equipped to perform non-economic 
analysis, and that such an approach would concentrate too much 
discretion within the competition authorities.  If, for instance, the 
Federal Trade Commission were tasked with conducting a “net 
benefit” analysis, considering all the goals discussed earlier, it 
would require greater resources.  It also would need the political 
strength to withstand the criticism it would inevitably attract 
year in and year out from disappointed parties and their 
supporters. 
Some countries, such as Canada and Australia, have 
established authorities separate from competition authorities to 
oversee foreign investment, applying a wide variety of goals 
either apart from consumer welfare or, as in Australia, including 
consumer welfare.82  A model like that adopted in Australia 
would contemplate the creation of a foreign investment review 
board to advise a cabinet member or the president, who in turn 
would have authority to disapprove foreign investments, 
applying a “national interest” or “net benefit” test. 
If such an arm of government were assigned responsibility in 
the United States for balancing all these goals in the context of 
foreign investment, who has the breadth of experience, depth of 
wisdom, and political respect to make such judgments?  The 
National Economic Council, as has been suggested by the Center 
for American Progress?83  Would its determination be subject to 
judicial review, and under what standard?  What about 
expanding the responsibilities of CFIUS, as proposed under the 
Foreign Investment and Economic Security bill,84 to apply a “net 
benefit” test to foreign acquisitions of control regardless of 
81 ROOSEVELT INST., supra note 25, at 21 (stating that “regulators and enforcers 
are routinely tasked with balancing a variety of goals and priorities.”). 
82 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs, 2015 Investment 
Climate Statement – Australia (2015); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic & 
Business Affairs, 2015 Investment Climate Statement – Canada (2015). 
83 JARSULIC ET AL., supra note 23, at 20.
84 See supra note 16.
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whether those acquisitions pose a threat to national security? 
Under that proposal, the Committee’s determination would be 
subject to review by the President, but otherwise would be non-
reviewable. 
What about creating a new body, modeled on Australia’s 
Foreign Investment Review Board?  How would it be composed 
and who would appoint its members?  Would it be modeled on the 
Federal Trade Commission, with members from more than one 
political party serving fixed terms or would it be reconstituted by 
each administration, like the Council of Economic Advisors? 
Who would have the ultimate responsibility—the Treasury  
Secretary?  The Commerce Secretary?  The President?  What 
would be the threshold for review?  Would judicial review be 
possible and, if so, under what standard? 
The simplest approach might be to expand the mission of 
CFIUS by defining “national security” to include economic 
security, or “national interest,” and to create a new advisory 
board, with adequate staffing, to provide the support that CFIUS 
would need to fulfill a broader mission with respect to 
acquisitions of foreign control that do not raise issues of national 
defense or homeland security.  Depending upon the scope of this 
new authority, there might be calls to add provisions to allow 
judicial review in those instances where neither national defense 
nor homeland security is involved.85 
It would be easiest to leave well enough alone, of course, but 
if the American economy truly is being threatened by the current 
approach, a new assignment of responsibility should be 
considered.  There are several viable alternatives, as just 
described, each of which has pros and cons.  What is clear is that 
if the present structure in the United States no longer is working 
satisfactorily, a new structure needs to be considered. 
III. HOW SHOULD GOALS BE BALANCED AND PRIORITIZED?
The last key issue, regardless of which goals are pursued and
which arm of government takes responsibility for each one, is 
how to resolve conflicts among the goals.  In the United States,  
85 For a discussion of the constitutionality of a statutory bar to judicial review, 
see Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS, 758 F.3d 296, 307–12 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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the answer to this question has emerged somewhat haphazardly, 
with little occasion for policymakers to ponder whether it is being 
done correctly. 
Should one goal trump another?  Should each goal be 
balanced against the others?  If different agencies with different 
goals are involved, should each have a veto?  If so, should there 
be priorities among the vetoes?  What about overriding vetoes—
should one arm of government have the right to override the veto 
of another arm? 
America has made its choices piecemeal.  Every agency, 
applying its own set of goals, potentially has a veto.  But now 
that advocates from both political parties have been calling on 
antitrust enforcers to do more to advance the economy, one 
reasonably can ask whether there are ways to improve upon the 
status quo.  As already described, there are several possibilities 
for dividing or consolidating responsibility.  But regardless of 
whether multiple agencies continue to share responsibility for 
reviewing business conduct or whether a single agency is tasked 
with pursuing all the goals, there does seem to be a natural order 
of priority worth considering. 
National security, as that term is traditionally understood, is 
the highest priority.  No country is willing to allow foreign 
interests to control the strategic assets essential to its defense. 
National interest has become the next highest priority in 
those countries that recognize the concept.  Although an 
acquisition might not threaten a country’s defenses, it might 
undermine its economic independence to an unacceptable extent. 
If a transaction fails the national interest test, it will be rejected 
regardless of whether it is neutral or beneficial in other respects. 
After that, low prices and full employment are particular 
priorities for most voters in the world’s democracies, including 
the United States.  The United States has treated low prices to 
consumers as a higher priority than job creation in this context, 
but plainly that presumption comes under increased pressure 
when unemployment becomes a greater concern. 
Dispersion of economic and political power is a growing 
priority, especially as inequality and its political implications 
attract increased attention.  But until now, this has not been an 
immediate priority, and jobs and prices have commanded greater 
consideration.  Has this changed? 
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Preserving small business opportunities is an important 
priority in America, but attracts attention from a narrower 
constituency.  Yet it remains important politically, and in certain 
cases could assume as high a priority as low prices. 
Concerns over the environment, government subsidies, and 
minority cultures are of great importance in particular instances 
but arise less often and have advocates in other parts of 
government, relegating them to lower priority in most 
competition discussions in the United States. 
If America were to adopt a net benefit test for foreign 
investment, could, and should, these goals be balanced against 
one another?  National security would trump all the others. 
National interest would require a more nuanced analysis.  In this 
process, the nationality of the acquiring party or other party 
under scrutiny could not be ignored.  Is it from a hostile country? 
Is it a state-owned entity?  Is it a sovereign wealth fund?  And 
how many of the world’s largest multinational companies even 
have national identities any more?  What makes a company an 
“American” company, or a “German” company, or a “Chinese” 
company? 
Consumer welfare traditionally would be a trump card as 
well.  When an antitrust agency wants to challenge a deal or a 
practice because it is likely to result in higher prices, it usually is 
dead on arrival, unless it turns out to be essential to national 
security. 
Harder than that would be balancing effects on employment, 
concentration of power, protection of small business, government 
subsidies, and so forth under a “net benefit” standard. 
Sometimes the answer would be obvious but in most instances 
there would be reasonable arguments on both sides.  Those few 
countries that have attempted to provide guidelines, such as 
South Africa and Australia, recommend little more than stirring 
all the considerations into a stew and judging whether the result 
is palatable. 
One response to this quandary is to simply conclude that 
balancing is too hard to accomplish, and so should not be 
undertaken at all.  Another response is to conclude that if these 
goals are not weighed against one another, too many undesirable 
transactions and practices will be permitted, to the detriment of 
the economy and the American public.  If Canada, Australia, and 
South Africa can prioritize to make hard decisions in order to 
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protect their economies, why, one might ask, can’t the United 
States?  Whether this reflects alarmism, protectionism, or 
realism, interest is swelling and the time has arrived for a robust 
debate. 
CONCLUSION 
Where does that leave us?  We conclude where we began. 
Critics have been complaining that there are too few jobs in 
America and too much inequality.  They have been calling for 
broadening the goals of antitrust and, at the very least, for more 
antitrust enforcement.  More enforcement could be expected to 
have an impact on the concentration of power and on jobs, but 
even recalibrating the goals of antitrust law cannot, by itself, 
realistically be considered a panacea for eliminating 
unemployment or inequality overnight. 
At the same time, other countries already have broader goals 
written into their own laws, including their competition laws, 
which protect jobs and limit foreign investment.  These laws 
create asymmetries that may be placing the United States at a 
disadvantage.  Today, America has the opportunity to expand the 
goals of its laws to address these asymmetries, either through 
broadening the interpretation of current legislation—which could 
but need not include the antitrust laws—or by enacting new 
laws.  Such changes would present the challenge of deciding who 
should apply these broader goals and how they should be 
prioritized and balanced.  If the antitrust agencies are not the 
choice to assume this responsibility, an expanded CFIUS or a 
newly constituted foreign investment review board would be 
possible alternatives.  These changes could foster an 
environment in which it would be easier for future trade 
agreements to assure a level playing field for the United States 
and its trading partners. 
The devil is in the details, of course, and the devil would feel 
right at home in this imbroglio.  Broadening and strengthening 
antitrust enforcement and foreign investment review sounds 
simple enough but would raise a dizzying host of complications 
and uncertainties.  Yet, just because something is hard to 
measure or hard to solve is no reason to ignore it.  If loss of jobs 
and concentration of power are threatening to harm the nation’s 
economy and are not being adequately checked, changing nothing 
would be an outcome but would not be a solution.  Not all of the 
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changes currently being proposed make equal sense, but for those 
that make the most sense, the time for serious deliberation is 
now. 
